Abstract -
INTRODUCTION
T ax administrations spend large amounts of their resources in monitoring and controlling tax evasion. Is it worth it? What is the role of institutional enforcement in enhancing compliance? This paper analyzes the effects of audits in generating individual compliance with taxes. Based on new data for two countries, we contend that audits did not yield better compliance among those found cheating, but did yield positive effects among taxpayers who were previously moderately in compliance. Cheaters further noncompliance after audits, while moderate compliers appear to take audit threats more seriously. This paper is based on VAT data from individual tax return information from Argentina and Chile between 1997 and 2000 and two randomly selected samples of taxpayers subjected to audit enforcement, as well as individual tax information for two control groups. By analyzing the effi cacy of audits in enhancing better individual compliance, we render additional support to the inconclusive effects of audits upon individual compliance, and we hypothesize that audits are more effective among the risk averse. compliance rate where approximately 22 percent of VAT fails to be collected, while in neighboring Argentina tax evasion is roughly double. The tax design, structure, and rates and the VAT tax base in both countries are comparable. Exemptions are limited to very few activities (mostly public transportation and strategic sectors), the tax base is estimated between 52 percent and 58 percent of GDP, and tax rates in the second half of the 1990s were 18 percent in Chile and 21 percent in Argentina. The structure, scope and institutional capacities of both tax administrations are also similar, raising questions as to the extent of tax administration enforcement in generating better compliance.
Most studies of post-enforcement tax behavior have relied on self-reported or aggregate information, and rarely depended on individually fi led tax information. In this paper, we analyze the postenforcement individual tax fi ling, relying on offi cial data of actual tax returns to assess post-enforcement compliance, and we conclude that the effects of audits are overestimated. Taxpayers who have previously cheated on taxes generally continue to do so. In Chile, however, the scale of noncompliance is lower, allowing its Tax Administration Offi ce (SII) to be more effective in targeting tax evaders compared to Argentina's tax administration (AFIP). The effect of specifi c enforcement on compliance, however, is meager.
In the following section, we briefly summarize propositions of compliance behavior. The third section presents the data, hypotheses and methods. The fourth section describes the fi ndings using descriptive statistical analyses. The fi fth section presents the results of a regression analysis to explain the changing rate of individual compliance. The sixth section summarizes the fi ndings, discusses them in the context of the original questions, and debates the role of the tax administration in enhancing compliance.
PREVIOUS WORK
Compliance with taxes has been associated with the perceived probability of detection and severity of punishment (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Slemrod, 1985; Martinez-Vazquez and Rider, 2003) . 2 According to the deterrence theory, the reasons for compliance are instrumental: Taxpayers comply because the benefi ts outweigh the costs.
3 Decisions to comply are closely related to the individual risk aversion, the opportunities to cheat and the perceived probabilities of detection and sanctions. Therefore, when individuals have contact with authorities, they are only interested in securing a favorable outcome.
The effect of audits upon compliance, however, remains understudied. The scant empirical research evaluates the indirect impact of audits on general tax compliance (see Dubin, Graetz and Wilde (1990), Beron, Tauchen and Witte (1992) , Engel, Galetovic and Raddatz, (2001), and Plumley, (2002) ). In particular Dubin et al. (1990) , using state-level aggregate data, have found a statistically signifi cant effect of audit rates on some measures of compli-ance (such as more income reported and offsets to income and tax claimed), rendering support to the hypothesis that audit rates positively affect higher compliance. It is unclear, however, how the mechanism works. In the Latin American context, Engel et al. (2001) analyze the parameters where additional marginal enforcement produces higher compliance, and Serra (2003) attributes the lion share of improved compliance to factors such as economic growth rather than tax enforcement.
Research that compares tax behavior prior to contact and after tax enforcement is scarce. Although some studies have been conducted on the effects of audits on taxpayers' perceptions of selfreported intentions for future compliance (Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein, 1998; Erard, 1992; Scholz, 1998) , to our knowledge there are very few studies that actually measure tax compliance based on tax return information. 4 Standard game theoretical models will predict no effect of audits on compliance (see Reinganum and Wilde (1985) , Cowell (1990) , Erard and Feinstein (1994) ). Given that probabilities of detections after audits might be better known for different levels of compliance, taxpayers will react accordingly, generating different alternative explanations: a) Audited taxpayers might feel that their chances to be re-audited increase (higher probabilities of detection) or, conversely, b) once being audited, the likelihood of another audit decreases; c) They might experience audit as traumatic or, alternatively, d) not as bad as originally perceived, inducing them to higher evasion; e) The outcome of the audit might affect perceptions of future probabilities of detection (more evasion detected can generate a taxpayer's fears of being under the "radar screen" of the Tax Administration) or, conversely, f) result in higher post-audit evasion given a poor detection of noncompliance in prior audits. Accordingly, audit can either increase or decrease subsequent compliance given the subjective estimated probabilities of detection, the sentiments or reactions of taxpayers to the audit experience, and the type of outcome of previous enforcements.
The few available empirical studies have also been inconclusive on the effects of audits upon compliance. Using Tax Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) data, Erard (1992) could not fi nd defi nite evidence to support improved compliance after audits. It appears that some taxpayers are deterred by audits, while others are not. Long and Schwartz (1987) , using similar data, found that the magnitude of noncompliance among cheaters does not change, whereas there is a moderate improvement among smaller noncompliers. On the other hand, the experimental data (Webley, Robben, Elffers and Hessing, 1991; Alm, Jackson and McKee, 1992; and, Bergman and Nevarez, 2005) suggest that subjects tend to report higher compliance in later rounds following enforcement. In a refi ned quasi-experimental model specifi cation, Bergman and Nevarez (2005) shows that the divergent trend of subsequent compliance after enforcement is due to the different pools of participants. Entrenched cheaters are not deterred by audits, while moderate cheaters appeared to be deterred. In short, it is assumed that there is a wide variance in reaction to audits.
If this assumption holds, it might partially explain the shortcomings of tax administrations in countries where tax evasion is very high, and the inability to reduce persisting tax evasion within trades or sectors even in higher compliance environments (Davis, Hecht and Perkins, 2003) . Since audit rates affect taxpayers prone to compliance, audits are effective general deterrence instru-4 This is mainly attributable to the secrecy of tax information and to legal impediments, particularly in the U.S., as well as in the countries of Western Europe. ments in places where such taxpayers are in abundance (as in the U.S., Western Europe and Chile). However, in places where most people cheat considerably (as in most developing countries, including Argentina), the pool of taxpayers prone to compliance shrinks and, therefore, audits do not generate general deterrence.
QUESTIONS AND DATA
In the appendix, we specify the characteristics of the information provided by the VAT and income tax return data we collected for this analysis. Surveys could not, unfortunately, complement the sample. 5 In this paper, we can only test several deterrence propositions.
Assumptions and Guiding Questions
Taxpayers who cheat on their taxes do so knowing about the risk of detection and sanctions. Therefore, we assume that beyond the unknown chances of being punished, taxpayers who cheat considerably do so because there are other considerations related to opportunities, competitiveness and personal values that at times override the sheer calculation of the probabilities of detection. We hypothesize that penalties do not affect future compliance and, due to other reasons, taxpayers who were assessed with fi nes and past tax liabilities will compensate those "losses" with additional future liabilities. In short, we fi rst ask how penalties and additional assessments incurred by audits affect future individual tax behavior.
Since selection for audits is not random, but biased by the Tax Administration's (TA) suspicion of noncompliance, we expect audited taxpayers to have lower compliance. More importantly, however, given that audits do not enhance higher compliance, we expect that the compliance gap between the audited taxpayers and the others will remain the same or even widen. We, therefore, ask a second question: To what extent do audits decrease post-enforcement tax contribution?
Finally, we tentatively assume that the variance in responses among audited taxpayers is heavily determined by the aggressiveness of prior reporting. The more is aggressive the tax evader, the less likely it is that s/he will change compliance behavior. Conversely, the more moderate is the previous evasion, the more likely it is that taxpayers will increase tax reporting. In short, we ask how the previous level of compliance affects post-audit tax behavior.
Data and Method
The VAT is the pillar of the tax system in both countries, and it is the tax most thoroughly audited. We use a well-developed methodology, the Debit/Credit (D/C) ratio (this is a proxy to the ratio of sales over purchases for a selected period of time). Debits are the total value-added tax charged by taxpayers when they sell goods or services. Credits are the value-added tax already paid by taxpayers when they purchase goods or services needed for manufacturing, retailing, etc. The difference between debits and credits is the taxpayer net VAT liability. 6 We contrast debits and credits as well as the ratio before and after the enforcement. 5 Ideally, self-reported data could be matched with a respondent's tax return information and the enforcement information generated by the tax administration; however, we were not permitted to assemble this database due to legal impediments. 6 If the ratio is lower than one, taxpayers had more credits than debits for a given period. The higher the ratio, the higher the gross profi t. Typically, manufacturing industries (that purchase raw materials) have lower debit/credit ratio than services. This is because the payroll (which is exempted from VAT) is heavier in the service sector. The lower is the Debit/Credit ratio, the more suspicious tax evasion becomes. However, the type of industry and the size of fi rms matter. For example, a service enterprise (a bank or an insurance
To control for seasonal and size effects, in the aggregate estimation, we compare the behavior of the enforced group to the aggregate behavior of a control group compiled from non-enforced taxpayers who share similar characteristics.
7 For the multivariate analysis, we compare the individual contributions of taxpayers in similar months.
The Argentine sample excludes 350 cases due to incomplete information and belonging to the largest category of taxpayers, 8 while the Chilean sample excludes 125 cases for similar reasons.
In the descriptive analysis, we measure compliance of the treatment group with respect to a control non-sanctioned group in both countries. If the gap widens, it indicates that enforcement has had a negative effect on compliance.
9
In addition to the compiled tax information, socio-demographic data were collected only for the sole-proprietor category in Argentina (34 percent of the sample). This is because the TA does not keep accurate information on corporations (66 percent of the sample). For Chile, the information is somewhat richer and has data on corporations. We also collected additional information on previous enforcement contacts. The data collection process has been verifi ed as correct through a sub-sample verification and manual validation of tax return information, and by crosschecking with other sources of internal information.
We include one fi nal methodological note: Comparing VAT returns between short periods could pose several problems. Ideally, periods of comparison should be at least one year, in order to neutralize seasonal and fi scal credit biases.
10 That data is available for Chile but, unfortunately, not for Argentina. In order to overcome these problems, we took two steps. First, we estimated two sets of comparisons, one that included at least the average D/C ratio for four months, and another that included eight months, depending on the data. Secondly, we compared pre-and post-enforcement periods for the same fi ling months. By comparing identical periods for different years, we have controlled for possible seasonal effects.
AGGREGATE RESULTS
The most puzzling result is that, on average, audits do not affect the level of future individual compliance. On the contrary, the gap between pre-and postaudit compliance rates for certain groups widens. On average, the non-audited have better compliance than audited taxpayers after enforcement. Figure 1 describes the median of the D/C ratio for the samples of both countries in the period prior to, during, and company) with a debit/credit ratio lower than 1.5 would be considered a "high risk" tax evasion. However, a car manufacturer, a food-processing fi rm, or a building company with the same debit/credit ratio might be considered very profi table enterprises. Compliance analysis must account for the sector and the size of the fi rm. 7 Each case of an enforced taxpayer has been matched to a "twin," non-enforced taxpayer. The "twin" case shares the same location, the same trade or activity code, and the same level of tax payments. See appendix. 8 A segment of the country's 2,000 major taxpayers is routinely audited on a rotating basis. 9 It should be remembered that taxpayers were selected to enforcement because they have lower D/C ratio than the median for the activity code. Thus, a reduction of the gap means that their D/C ratio is closer to the median, i.e., less noncompliant with respect to the industry. 10 Some sectors accumulate credits over a long period of time and generate debits (sales) in very short periods of time. For example, an apartment construction company accumulates credits while purchasing building materials over many months and, sometimes, years. Then it sells all the apartments in one month, generating a large amount of debits. Since VAT is fi led monthly, the D/C ratio for that company in that particular month would be unusually high.
after audits. 11 Each line indicates the ratio of the audited group with respect to the non-audited control group in each country. For example, the median of the D/C ratio of VAT for Chile in the period prior to audit was 90 percent of the median for the non-audited group over the same period. It was 104 percent for the period during audit and decreased to 89 percent for the period after the audit.
Prior to audits, in both Chile and Argentina, the D/C ratio of audited taxpayers is smaller (less than 100 percent) than the control group. Compliance increases slightly during audits and returns to previous levels or even decreases after the audits are closed. Given that taxpayers are selected on the basis of a presumption of tax evasion, larger noncompliance should be expected among the audited group prior to the audit. Therefore, the smaller medians of ten percent in Chile and 17 percent in Argentina compared to their respective control groups render support to the noncompliance selection bias of the audit departments.
Several tax administration officials contend that taxpayers refrain from misreporting sales during audits, yielding an increase in compliance in that period. 12 We tested the offi cials' hypothesis and could not fi nd substantial support. Reported sales among those audited did not increase signifi cantly during audits compared to the non-audited taxpayers. In fact, 53 percent of the Argentines and 57 percent of the sanctioned Chileans actually reduce reported sales during the audit period. As will be discussed below, evasion strategies appeared to be the result of the manipulation of fake purchases.
Tables 1A-D report the median of several distributions of the net balance paid (debits minus credits) for both countries across different samples. 13 The fi rst column reports the difference of two distributions: the net balance median paid in the post-audit period minus the net balance median for the period before the audit. The second and third columns are not exactly the same distributions, although they yield similar results. The second col- 11 We present here the median, although the mean curve is similar for Figure 1 . 12 If such an assumption is correct, it might indicate that the actual level of compliance during audits should be considered the compliance base for the audited group. In other words, the compliance median for tax evaders (the audited-sanctioned group) should be at least eight percent higher in Chile and two percent higher in Argentina. 13 We report pesos for both countries. At the time of the data collection, the conversion rate in Argentina was 1 peso equals 1 US$, while, in Chile, 550 pesos equaled 1 US$. umn is the median of the distribution for the difference in net VAT payment of each group. The third column is the median of the distribution for the percentage change of the difference in contribution with respect to the period before audits. These differences between non-audited and audited groups are presented for the entire Chilean and Argentine samples (Tables 1A and 1D ). While in Argentina 98 percent of the sample was found to be noncompliant, in Chile only 62 percent of audited taxpayers were sanctioned. Therefore, we present, for Chile, different tables-one that compares audited sanctioned and non-sanctioned taxpayers (1B), and another for sanctioned taxpayers with respect to the non-audited control group (1C).
These results show that the gap between both samples is noticeable and, in all cases, the difference between the groups is statistically signifi cant at different levels. Audited groups consistently decrease the net payments to the tax authority more than the control group does (see fi rst column). The trend is very clear in all distributions. The median of sanctioned taxpayers decreases in all cases, signaling that (on the aggregate) audited taxpayers do not pay more taxes after enforcement. These results, however, signal that for certain taxpayers audits might increase post-audit compliance. In Chile (Table 1B) , the previously compliant (those audited taxpayers who were not assessed with additional liabilities) pay considerably more than sanctioned taxpayers contributing to a better overall compliance trend. 14 A closer analysis of credits and debits in Chile yields another meaningful result. Between 1998 and 2000, the reported credits (purchases) grew more than the reported debits (sales). The median debit of the sanctioned group fell more (-3.6 percent) than that of the non-audited group (-1.4 percent), and the median credit (0.57 percent) grew more than for the control group (0.29 percent). On aggregate, the trend of sanctioned taxpayers is to report lower sales and more purchases compared to the control group, leading to lower compliance. In short, sanctioned groups in Chile appear to show a moderate drop in compliance after enforcement, both by reducing the sales and increasing the reported purchases.
As mentioned above, to illegally reduce tax dues, taxpayers can either manipulate sales in order to diminish their reported debits or artifi cially increase credits by reporting fake purchases, which carries the risk of severe sanctions.
15 What appears to explain better compliance during the audit period is the reduction of reported purchases (credits). In Argentina, 65 percent of those sanctioned/audited (compared to 48 percent of the control group) decreased the reported purchases during audits, yielding a higher D/C ratio (from three to nine percent; see Figure  1 ). However, once the audits have been fi nalized, many of these taxpayers might feel "safer" to include a fake invoice, assuming that another enforcement action in the near future is unlikely. Since tax balances in VAT are carried forward, taxpayer purchases can be reported in subsequent months in order to reduce the net debit-credit balance. 16 This is presumably what happened in the post-audit period, accounting for the decrease in the D/C ratio immediately after audits, as some taxpayers probably used fake invoices. Other independent research supports these fi ndings. A study by Fundación Mediterranea has found that the ratio between the reported fi scal credits by taxpayers and the theoretic fiscal credit derived from the analysis of national accounts increased from 1.34 in 1997 to 1.47 in 2001 (Argañaraz, 2004) . It seems that the use of fake invoices became the favorite strategy of tax evasion in Argentina (indications from personal interviews with tax offi cials in Chile suggest that this practice is also widely used there). This is also supported by Martinez-Vazquez and Rider (2003) who claim that taxpayers take advantage and shift among different opportunities to defy full compliance. It seems that, in the late 1990s, "infl ated credits" became the most suitable evasion strategy.
Finally, the total amount of fi nes and additional taxes levied in audits account for 54 percent of the difference in net VAT payments between the pre-and post-audit periods. In other words, the total reduction in VAT contributions of the enforced group (adjusted by the control groups) is almost twice as larger as the revenues collected in fi nes and additional assessments. The net effect of audits is puzzling. Had audits not taken place, and had the compliance trend continued at the rate of the pre-audit period, the net revenues from these taxpayers would have been greater. Clearly, taxpayers who were assessed with additional taxes and fi nes made up for their losses later with even greater noncompliance. Additional assessments were apparently "compensated for" by future noncompliance.
17
The assessed taxes and penalties and the level of post-audit noncompliance are positively correlated for both countries (r = 0.28), indicating that the larger the fi ne, the greater is the post-noncompliance. In short, penalties have the undesired effect of reducing compliance.
Several initial conclusions can be drawn. First, in both countries, the group of audited-sanctioned taxpayers decreases net payments and future compliance, and they appear to compensate for the "losses" produced by audits.
18 Second, although the trend remains similar, future noncompliance in Chile is somewhat more moderate than in Argentina. And third, the impact of audits is greater on those audited but not sanctioned, i.e., the more compliant taxpayers. This last evidence suggests that audit policies are more effective among those who take the threat seriously, i.e., those who are more deterred by the tax administration. It appears that the higher is the tax evasion, the less likely it is taxpayers will reduce noncompliance due to audit. The models of the next section render additional proof on the negative association between fi nes and compliance.
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS
Thus far, we have analyzed data using aggregate behavior. We have suggested, however, that taxpayers react differently and, consequently, the effects of enforcement differ. In this section, we present results of regression models to test the determinants of individual compliance. 16 Also, if a taxpayer has overpaid in one month, tax liabilities can be deducted in the following months. 17 This is particularly relevant for Argentina. We estimated that AFIP's lost revenues as a result of the increased subsequent noncompliance equal three months of tax dues for the entire sample. In other words, the increased noncompliance compensates for the taxpayers' assessed losses in just 90 days. Therefore, the new net revenues raised by the tax agency through audits will, in fact, be wiped out within the following 90 days of current revenues, as a result of post-audit noncompliance. 18 The data also indicates that smaller businesses have, on average, larger future noncompliance.
We test the change of individual compliance behavior after audits.
The dependent variable is the percentage of change in the tax report, measured by the net payment to the agency after an audit with respect to the period before audits, i.e., the amount by which taxpayers increase or decrease their net VAT payments after the audits have been discharged. The independent variables included are:
(a) Assessments (Ln_ Assessment). This variable measures the log of additional assessments resulting from audits. Additional assessments include fi nes and penalties. This variable tests the effect of pecuniary charges due to audits on future compliance. (b) The size of the fi rm (Size). This is a continuous variable that accounts for the size of the fi rms. It is the log of debits (a proxy for sales) for the period before audits. (c) The region (Region). This is a dummy variable where 1= interior and 0= metropolitan area (Greater Santiago for Chile and greater Buenos Aires for Argentina). (d) The difference in sales (Dif_Sales).
This variable measures the percentage of increase in debits in order to control for larger tax payments due to natural increases in sales. (e) The negative previous balance (D_ balance). This is a dummy variable signaling that a taxpayer in the period prior to the audit did not pay VAT because it carried a balance in his favor. This control variable is very important for VAT compliance analysis because taxpayers who accumulate previously paid VAT balances do not have to pay taxes and are still in compliance. This variable also assumes a strong association with the dependent variable because it is very unlikely that these taxpayers will continue to have negative payments for extended periods. Net tax payments are expected to improve signifi cantly for this group. (f) No-Compliance. This is a dummy variable only relevant for Chile, where a large segment of those audited have not been charged with additional assessments (1 = charged, 0 = no additional charges).
We present results for several models (two for Argentina and four for Chile) estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). For both countries, all eligible cases were included. Model 1 for each country tests the effect of audit assessment on future contribution, including two basic controls-the size of the fi rm and the region. Model 2 includes two relevant variables for VAT compliance-the difference in sales between periods and the status of carrying a previous VAT negative balance. Model 3 adds the control of those who were found to be in noncompliance. This case is only relevant for Chile, where 62 percent of this sample was found to be in noncompliance, and the rest were in full compliance. In Argentina, on the other hand, only two percent of the cases rendered no additional assessments; therefore, there are not enough cases in this country to control for full compliance. We introduce a dummy variable where 1 = found to be in noncompliance.
19 Given these results, we estimate a fourth model for Chile that includes only those taxpayers found to be in noncompliance. This last model allows for a better comparison with the second model for Argentina.
An initial and steady result across the models indicates that fi rms of the rural areas and the provinces tend to increase the level of tax payment after audits in both countries. Also, the larger is the fi rm, the more the individual percentage increases in VAT payments.
As expected, the previous negative balance is positively associated with an increase in tax payments. Also, for both countries, the difference in sales is statistically signifi cant. Leaving other variables constant, each percentage increase in reported sales has a 6.7 percent increase in net tax payments for Argentina and around a three percent increase for Chile. The coeffi cient suggests that the increase in sales explains better compliance in Argentina. 20 This fi nding is also consistent with the hypothesis that one of the best predictors of compliance is the firm's economic well-being (Serra, 2003) .
The most important fi nding, however, is the effect of the assessments on future compliance. The coeffi cient is stable for both models in Argentina and it dramatically changes in Chile for the last two models. In Argentina, every log unit increase of assessments due to audits yields signifi cantly lower tax contribution afterwards. In Chile, the effect of assessments appears inconsistent because in models 1 and 2 there is a good portion of compliers that neutralizes such an effect. However, once these observations are controlled for (with the dummy no-compliance in model 3), the results appear to be robust. 21 A fourth model that includes only the noncompliance cases shows similar coeffi cients to the third model. Moreover, the coeffi cients of the fourth model are very similar to the ones for Argentina, namely, for every log unit of additional assessment there is an ulterior reduction of six to seven percent in tax contribution after audits for both countries. Holding constant all other variables, the higher the additional assessments, the lower are the future tax payments.
In this sense, these models support the previous section analysis where a "compensation effect" appears to be present. These models also predict that higher penalties and fi nes will yield a decrease in the percentage of tax payments as a result of audits. Conversely, given the Questions of endogeneity might be raised on this variable given some taxpayers' strategies to artifi cially manipulate sales in order to reduce tax payments. We have run a 2SLS using different proxies and, based on the results of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests, we can not reject the null hypothesis; thus, we safely assume that in this case there are no problems of endogeneity. 21 Correlation between the dependent variable of post-enforcement contribution and the dummy no-compliance groups is 0.05. drastic change in the coeffi cients for Chile, many of those who were found to be in compliance appear to have an increased percentage of VAT payments even when controlling for other effects. In short, for taxpayers who take higher noncompliance risks, enforcement does not deter future compliance behavior in Chile, while moderate or small tax evaders appear to be more deterred by personal enforcement. Finally, a very important fi nding from this analysis is that cheaters appear to behave similarly irrespective of the social environment in which they live. Model 2 for Argentina and model 4 for Chile render similar results despite the difference in the tax compliance trends of these two countries.
DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY
We have provided evidence to reject the claim that tax audits in these countries directly increases individual compliance. On the contrary, the results signal that sanctions have the perverse effect of increasing tax evasion to a large extent in Argentina, and to a considerable degree also in Chile. In comparable studies conducted in the U.S., the results have been mixed (Beron et al., 1992) ; however, our study has shown a neutral or even a perverse effect of decreasing compliance. Why does enforcement in two different tax environments like Chile and Argentina show these peculiar results?
One of the most plausible responses is that enforcement does not affect specifi c, but rather general, deterrence. The threat of punishment is credible among those who remain unenforced. Once audits or other enforcement actions have occurred, the threat is no longer perceived as severe among entrenched cheaters. Many studies have provided compelling evidence that a high risk of detection discourages noncompliance. Our evidence suggests that there was no high risk of detection among the audited taxpayers, and those sanctioned appeared undeterred by future sanctions. Many studies suggest that audits have little specifi c deterrent value (Erard, 1992; Mason and Kinsey, 1996) . This study not only supports that assertion, but even provides additional proof that audits, under certain conditions, negatively affect the accuracy of subsequent tax reporting.
Chile's higher compliance levels than those of Argentina notwithstanding, individual enforcement did not encourage better abidance. This article shows that Chilean cheaters do not appear to be deterred by enforcement. Conversely, enforced taxpayers who have previously complied take the threats of audits seriously. The assessment coefficients for Chile in models 1 and 2 suggest that compliers neutralize the perverse effect of audits shown in models 3 and 4 and in models for Argentina. As shown in Table  1B , audited compliers in Chile increase future tax payments. This conclusion, however, says nothing about the large majority of non-enforced taxpayers. In other words, cheaters might always be cheaters, but in a world of legalists, they might be circumscribed into a small target group. The better post-audit compliance of the non-sanctioned in Chile shows that compliers have taken enforcement more seriously. Nothing similar was found in Argentina.
Under a wide compliance equilibrium (as in the case of Chile, the U.S. and many other nations where most taxpayers comply to the extent that others do), audits and other enforcement measures might better serve general, rather than specifi c, deterrence. Under this equilibrium, cheaters might continue to cheat, but the majority of honest taxpayers see the tax administration as capable of posing a credible threat and, more importantly, that compliance within the community is widespread. Conversely, under the noncompliance equilibrium (as in Argentina), enforcement fails to enhance specifi c deterrence and very likely fails to achieve general deterrence as well. This is because taxpayers are forced to cheat to keep the same level of operation (as all competitors do the same) and, as the evidence suggest, they cheat even more after enforcement. Unless everybody stops evading at once, there is no coordinated solution that makes individual compliance a valuable strategy. This is because enforcement is effective to the extent that it is circumscribed to a small group of free-riders, or that it has the capability of monitoring the majority of the targeted population. Therefore, the scale of tax evasion matters.
Do audits enhance wider compliance? The answer seems rather simple: it depends on the particular social context and on the given individual. Under social orders that enjoy a larger compliance environment, audits might enhance general deterrence. In societies where cheating is the norm, they do not foster higher individual compliance.
pleted in August-September 1999. The matching non-audited sample of 773 was drawn using similar criteria as in Argentina.
All the offi cial data were processed by the AFIP and SII information departments. For every data set, we established the specifi cation for sample selection, which required specially written computer programs. For all the samples, there was random manual crosscheck of cases to ensure that accurate information was drawn from the central database. The information was, thus, validated.
